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RACE, RIOTS AND THE RULE OF LAW
DEBORAH WAIRE POST*
I cried when I heard the decision in the Rodney King case. I cried
because I am the mother of a black youth who is on the threshold of
manhood. Christopher, my son, recently experienced a surge of testos-
terone. He grew several inches and developed a thin dark line of hair
above his lip. His voice startles me because it is so unfamiliar, so unlike
the sweet voice of the little boy I have lived with for fourteen years.
I cried when I heard the verdict in the Rodney King case because I
am a lawyer and I know the power of presumptions.2 This particular
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Green whose enthusiasm for the subject and the research enhanced my own interest and
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1. People v. Powell, No. BA-035498 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1992).
2. See generally the discussion of presumptions as legal fictions in LON FULLER,
LEGAL FICrIONS (1967). Presumptions are legal fictions, generalizations drawn from real
life that are applied in situations where the state of facts assumed in the generalization
does not exist. Id. at 41. In the case of Rodney King, the presumption that black men are
dangerous was imbedded in the defense's arguments that: the police were justified in be-
lieving that (1) Rodney King was guilty of some crime because they had to engage in a high
speed chase to apprehend him and (2) Rodney King was on PCP, a drug which would have
endowed him with super-strength and made him oblivious to pain. Both assumptions
proved to be false. Yet the jury used them to justify the response of the police.
Fuller distinguishes between expository and emotive legal fictions. Id at 53-56. Emo-
tive fictions are persuasive because they make us feel that a particular result is "just and
proper." Id. at 54. It is an epistomological freeway. By-passing reason and self-conscious
consideration, emotive fictions are directly knowable. They attach themselves to ideas
which are a matter of faith; values and beliefs to which we are committed emotionally. An
older woman from the town where I live with my son expressed the presumption the fol-
lowing way: "I think we see a black man as a destructive thing. That's my opinion as a
white person. They're the ones that are usually apprehended as criminals." Alvin E. Bes-
sent, L. 's Great Divide: Poll on Race Relations Finds Pessimism, and a Chasm, NEWSDAY, May 17,
1992, at 51.
We could treat this idea that black men are dangerous as a rebuttable presumption
and arguably, that is what the jury did in the Rodney King case. As Fuller points out, the
acceptance of someone else's inference without putting that person to the task of proving
the facts has an effect on the administration ofjustice. Procedure can affect the outcome;
the result in the case is often determined by the assignment of the burden of proof to one
side or the other. Id. at 45.
We could test the basic premise of the presumption, examining the data or facts which
are the basis for the generalization. Certainly, there is a perception that Blacks commit
more crimes than whites and that Blacks are disproportionately represented in the crimi-
nal justice system and the prisons in this country. The reasonableness of a fear based on
this data can be questioned if there is evidence, which is unrelated to their predisposition
toward violence, to explain the disproportionate representation of Blacks in the criminal
justice system. See generally Candace Kruttschnitt, Criminal Justice System: Social Determinants,
in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 470-76 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983); Charles
V. Willie & Ozzie L. Edwards, Race and Crime in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE
1347-50 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983) (a bibliography and summary discussion of the
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presumption puts my son's life at risk, even more than before. This jury
sociological work done in the area of criminal law, the relationship between race and class
and the effect of both at various points in the criminal justice system). See also the follow-
ing articles that deal with racial bias and the effect it has on the criminal justice system:
Dwight L. Greene, Abusive Prosecutors: Gender, Race and Class Discretion and the Prosecution of
Drug Addicted Mothers, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 737 (1991); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and
the White Jury, 83 MicH. L. REV. 1611 (1985); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to
Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214 (1983); Margaret M. Russell, Entering Great America: Reflec-
tions on Race and the Convergence of Progressive Legal Theory and Practice, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 749
(1992) ("gang profiling" as a means of identifying and labeling dangerous men and the
impact on Black, Latino and Asian men).
The statistical data on the number of black men who are arrested, prosecuted and
convicted of crimes is suspect because racism is pervasive throughout the criminal justice
system. The presence and effect of racism makes the use of "neutral" statistics misleading
and makes the efficacy of any presumption questionable. Even if the data were conclusive,
it would not justify the use of a presumption, which operates as an excuse in any confron-
tation between a white police officer and a black man, placing the burden on the black man
to show that the presumption did not apply in a particular case. For an example of such a
presumption in operation, see a discussion of the experiences of black men on the campus
of Duke University in Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Notes from California: Rodney King and the
Race Question, 70 DENV. U. L. REV. 199 (1993). See also Diana Jean Schemo, Singling Out
Blacks Where Few Are To Be Found, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1992, at BI (describing the incident
at Oneonta College where college officials gave the names of 125 black male students to
police investigating an attempted rape).
It is important to consider why we use presumptions. Concerns with efficiency, stabil-
ity and superior access to proof underlie presumptions. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 343
(John William Strong ed., 4th ed. i992). At the heart of each rationale is some calculation
of the effect on or cost to society and the injustices which might result because of the use
of a presumption. In a criminal case, concerns with due process protect the defendant
from presumptions which might lower the state's standard of proof. Defendants can offer
an affirmative defense; but, I know of no instance where a presumption, a fact inferred
from the existence of other facts, operates to exonerate a defendant from a crime. See
generally MCCORMICK §§ 346-48. Arguably, any presumption supported by these particu-
lar facts, for example the ugly empirically verifiable reality of racism, would serve to per-
petuate the advantage and the power, including the power of life and death, that police
already have. The existence of such a presumption would invite physical abuse of any
subordinated group.
Guido Calabresi has discussed the relationship between the reasonable person stan-
dard and racism in tort law. GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATrrrUDES, AND THE LAW
(1985). He concludes that the pull of Constitutional norms leads us to protect those be-
liefs which would usually seem idiosyncratic and that such norms are a significant factor in
determining what is reasonable. Id. at 60. In an earlier section of the book that discusses
insurance rates, Calabresi cites surrogate classifications for race (in the criminal law, these
surrogates might focus on clothing or age or geographic location). Calabresi points out
that:
[W]e are unwilling to admit openly that some groups in our flawed society may
have attributes which are undesirable and even dangerous. However, because we are
in a deep sense responsible for the existence of these attitudes, we would like
both to deny their existence and to avoid hindering or excluding further those
who have such attitudes. We would like to do this without in any way suggesting
that the attitudes themselves are to be tolerated, let alone encouraged. It is this
ambivalence that so often pushes us into subterfuges and wishful thinking.
Id. at 42-43.
I think that the problem in criminal law is similar. The law makes discrimination ille-
gal and racism unconstitutional. If the law has no effect, the resentment, hostility and
maybe even violence of black groups, may be both unreasonable and predictable. Black
men are no more dangerous than any other human being. Some feel the problem stems
from deprivation and anger. The black community, in particular, black men, currently
bear the burden of racism, even though the illegal and immoral behavior of the white
community is responsible for breeding the violence. It is a burden that is imposed
through the use of presumptions like the one that labels all black men dangerous. Even if
more black men than white men commit crimes; even if the proportion of black men com-
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verdict, this acquittal, legitimizes the presumption that black men are
dangerous.
When Christopher was in sixth grade, I had a parent/teacher con-
ference with his homeroom/social studies teacher. I remember how sur-
prised he was at what he called Chris' emotional development. In his
words, Chris had "a very good sense of the human condition." He elab-
orated further, "Chris knows that people are not perfect; that the world
is not perfect. He has great sympathy and understanding for people."
It was not long after that meeting that Christopher came home from
school, sat down at our kitchen table and confessed to me that he had
thrown a classmate up against a locker. He did this when he heard his
white classmate call a black girl, who was also in their class, a "nigger."
The student did not understand Christopher's violent reaction. "Why
are you angry?" he asked, "I didn't call you nigger?"
Chris had taken matters into his own hands. He administered a
punishment that he thought appropriate; one that was likely to deter
future transgressions. Chris never considered approaching the school
authorities to report the incident that made him angry. Most children
adhere to an unwritten code that discourages reporting such incidents
to adults. As a parent, though, I felt I should have been able to say,
"You should have reported it to the principal. There was no need to
take matters into your own hands." I honestly could not tell him that.
We both knew that students get detention for running in the halls, or for
throwing food in the cafeteria, but there is no detention for engaging in
hate speech.3 We both knew that the response of the principal would
have been similar to that of the student. Arguably, my son experienced
no harm. However, if his assault on his classmate had been reported to
the principal, Chris would have had no defense.
4
mitting crimes is greater than the proportion of white men committing crimes; even if
black men are more dangerous than white men, young black men should be able to walk
the streets and drive through neighborhoods without fear of the police. It is part of their
right to what Calabresi calls the "unfettered participation" in the activities which are "es-
sential to being a part of our society." Id. at 34.
3. The middle school in my school district has several kinds of sanctions available:
(1) detention, which is the punishment imposed for the least serious delicts and (2) in-
house suspension, a punishment, which is reserved for major transgressions. Detention
occurs before or after school. In house suspension means the student spends the day in
the "time out" room. Detention is used for relatively minor transgressions like food fights
in the cafeteria or rude or disrespectful behavior (usually towards attendants and teachers'
aides). Sometimes teachers and administrators are creative in making detention unpleas-
ant. See, e.g., Frank Sinatra: He's Still Crooning, But 90's Teens Sure Don't Swoon, NEWSDAY,
Sept. 22, 1992, 519 (teacher plays Frank Sinatra records during detention).
4. After I heard about an incident at an adjacent school district with a much more
ethnically diverse student body, where a student was suspended for calling an Asian class-
mate a derogatory name, I felt it was only fair to test my assumption. I called the principal
at my son's middle school, Mr. Nadler, and interviewed him. I told him what had hap-
pened to Chris and asked what he would have done. He said that the student who used the
racial epithet would have been placed in the "time out" room. This would be viewed as an
opportunity to re-educate the student, give him an opportunity to grow from the experi-
ence and talk about the impact of his actions on other people and the alternative choices
available to him. Chris would have received the same punishment for the inappropriate
use of force. I am not sure what effect my status as a law professor had on Mr. Nadler, but
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Around commencement time last year, Chris and I listened to the
remarks of President Bush in which he dismissed the need for regula-
tions which would give us a remedy for racist remarks like the one ut-
tered by Chris' white classmate. George Bush explained to us, and to all
America, that the norms of civility are sufficient to control such behav-
ior. People with "good breeding" do not call other people names.5 The
President, the man who would defend America and the ideal of patriot-
ism from political dissidents who burn the American flag, condemned
hate speech regulations and reminded us that free speech is what de-
mocracy is all about.
6
he commented that he would treat the behavior of the student who used the word "nig-
ger" as a violation of the law. I did not correct him.
5. I found President Bush's remarks on free speech confusing and contradictory. He
managed somehow to acknowledge, and then deny, the danger of racism in the same
speech.
Ironically, on the 200th anniversary of our Bill of Rights, we find free speech
under assault throughout the United States, including on some college campuses.
... What began as a crusade for civility has soured into a cause of conflict and
even censorship .... [Plolitical extremists roam the land, abusing the privilege of
free speech .... Such bullying is outrageous. It's not worthy of a great nation
grounded in the values of tolerance and respect. So, let us fight back against the
boring politics of division and derision. Let's trust our friends and colleagues to
respond to reason. As Americans we must use our persuasive powers to conquer
bigotry once and for all. We must conquer the temptation to assign bad motives
to people who disagree with Us.
Remarks at the University of Michigan Commencement Ceremony in Ann Arbor, May 4,
1991, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 563, 565 (May 13, 1991).
6. President Bush was reacting to Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), a Supreme
Court decision which classified flag-burning as protected speech. A political brouhaha
followed, punctuated by calls for a Constitutional Amendment to prevent such unpatriotic
acts. There are other policies that I think reflect the ambivalence (or hypocrisy) of the past
administration on speech-related matters. The Bush Administration supported the gag
order that would deny federal funding to family planning centers that offer abortion coun-
seling. The regulations adopted by the Health and Human Resources Administration, 42
C.F.R. § 59 (1991), withstood a constitutional challenge based on the First Amendment in
Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) and also a Congressional attempt to overturn them
that President Bush vetoed. A concern for free speech (of doctors) was offered as a ration-
ale for a memorandum issued by the President to the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, which proposed four principles to govern the implementation of the regulations.
Ultimately, these four principles, which were adopted by HHS, were the basis for declara-
tory relief from the gag order granted in a recent federal court decision. National Family
Planning and Reproductive Health Ass'n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (failure
to comply with the notice and comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act).
Vice President Quayle was not concerned that his support for the police organizations
advocating a boycott of Warner Records might chill the free speech of rappers like Ice-T,
whose heavy metal band performs the song "Cop Killer." ICE-T AND BODY COUNT, Cop
Killer, on BODY CouNT (Time-Warner Bros. 1992). See generally John Leland, Rap and Race,
NEWSWEEK, June 29, 1992, at 47 (discussing the controversy).
I do not pretend to have expertise in the First Amendment arena. Certainly, I cannot
engage in the kind of critique that has been offered by others who are much more knowl-
edgeable on the subject. See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 810 n.5 (Wis.), cert.
granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3435 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1992) (No. 92-515) (citing articles on the First
Amendment);Jack M. Battaglia, Regulation of Hate Speech by Educational Institutions: A Proposed
Policy, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 345 (1991) (summarizing the literature on the subject);
Nicholas Wolfson, Free Speech Theory and Hateful Words, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1991); see also
Leslie Epstein, Civility and Its Discontents: Offensive Speech on Campus, AM. PROSPECT, Summer
1991, at 23; Franklyn S. Haiman, The Remedy is More Speech, AM. PROSPECT, Summer 1991,
at 30; Cass R. Sunstein, Ideas, Yes; Assaults, No, AM. PROSPECT, Summer 1991, at 35 (debate
among and between these three authors concerning the First Amendment).
I have observed the debate with a certain fascination, wondering why lawyers and law
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If a balance must be struck between the competing values of equal-
ity and liberty, I personally think we ought to err in the direction of
equality. 7 But then, I think of prejudice as an infectious disease. There
professors never feel comfortable unless they have a classificatory system on which to rely
to explain the choices that are made with respect to the government control over forms of
speech. Why must we try to fit speech that we find pathological and socially dangerous
within some pre-existing category devised by a court which may or may not choose to
discuss the social values the categories are meant to promote or preserve. "In a sense, the
entire jurisprudence of free speech reflects a general categorization, composed of assump-
tions about which kinds of communicative acts are inside the first amendment and which
are outside." LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUrIONAL LAw 940 (2d ed. 1988) (citing
Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV.
265 (1981)). Obviously, the attempt to tailor a statute to fit within a doctrine does not
guarantee success. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (city ordi-
nance drafted with the assistance of Catherine MacKinnon to fit hate speech within the
'fighting words' category violated the Constitution).
First Amendment doctrine reveals much about the value choices we make as a nation
and the commitment to traditional concepts of what is good and what is bad for the body
politic. I have noted with some amazement the willingness of the Court to contemplate
the possibility of valuelessness when speech involves human sexuality. The Court takes a
two-track approach to obscenity-one that involves it in a discussion of the value of the
speech and the harm that the speech can cause, while the other appears neutral, but is not.
Even speech that might be protected can be regulated with zoning ordinances designed to
protect the moral sensibilities of the community. TRIBE, supra at 934. The government
need not tolerate speech that one might assume is political, and protected, if the Court
chooses to focus on where the speech occurs, rather than what is being said or if it invokes
the false dichotomy between speech and conduct. Compare Young v. New York City
Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 516 (1990) (municipality could
regulate beggars to protect the public from the threatening and annoying conduct of the
beggars, since begging was not protected speech) with Loper v. New York City Police De-
partment, 802 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (loitering ordinance unconstitutional be-
cause beggars were using the public streets. The court explicitly discusses the message
communicated by the act of begging).
Courts almost universally reject the need for hate speech regulations even when they
acknowledge the fact that such speech was traditionally or historically intended to intimi-
date and threaten particular communities within our society. R.A. V.. 112 S. Ct. at 2539-50;
UMW Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis.
1991); Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). Hate speech will
never be unprotected as long as the Supreme Court thinks that the harm caused by the
speech is offset by some positive value it places on that speech. Hate speech will continue
to have value as long as it is considered "political" speech.
I suppose my disagreement with First Amendment absolutists is born of cynicism.
Not all "political" dissidents deserve the protection of the First Amendment. True polit-
ical dissidents seldom receive the protection they deserve. If exceptions exist, and clearly
they do under a variety of doctrines, why not adopt an approach which brings the discus-
sion of values out into the open. Antipathy towards the ideas contained in speech may be
appropriate. President Bush supported a constitutional amendment which would have si-
lenced one form of expression of dissatisfaction with the government. He, and others like
him, believed unpatriotic behavior should be punished because it is more harmful than the
speech of extremists who advocate genocide. Perhaps we should debate the values re-
flected in this choice.
7. Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). Judge Cohn
noted in his introduction that "[i]t is an unfortunate fact of our constitutional system that
the ideals of freedom and equality are often in conflict." Id. at 853.
If constitutional lawyers are unable to see equality as the more compelling interest in
these cases, at the very least there should be a recognition that the hatred contained in
such speech poses a significant danger to the survival of our nation. Hatred is the solvent
that dissolves the bonds of a community; it causes death and destruction. Anyone who has
any doubts on this subject need only to look at the tragedy that continues in what used to
be Yugoslavia.
Justice Robert H. Jackson, perhaps because of the role he played in the Nuremberg
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is no reasoning with hate. It is irrational. Racism and prejudice of every
kind are forms of psychosis; flaws in the human psyche, which make
those who suffer from them dangerous.
From my perspective as a member of a group threatened by the
resurgence and growing violence of white supremacy groups, the threat
to my liberty and my safety justifies a minor limitation on the freedom of
a Skinhead or member of the Aryan Brotherhood to engage in hate
speech. I would like to prevent, not avenge, the death of my son at the
hands of some adolescent misfit who could be recruited and then per-
suaded to kick my son to death.8
The Republican administrations of Reagan and Bush, as well as the
Justice Department and the judiciary they have transformed with their
appointments, do not share my views. The invalidation of hate speech
regulations is justified by denying the reality of my experience and the
reality of racism. There is no official recognition of either the immediate
harm done by such speech or the direct connection between such speech
and violence against Blacks, Jews, women or homosexuals, to name
others who are the object of hate speech and bias crimes.
It is hardly surprising that those who are at risk resort to self-help.
After exhausting every legal argument available to block the march
through Skokie, Illinois, the survivors of the holocaust resorted to self-
help. They threw rocks at the Nazis whose free speech rights had been
defended by the American Civil Liberties Union and vindicated by the
federal courts. 9 In 1992, the peaceful march in Denver on Martin Lu-
Trials, understood better than most the danger of hatred and the power of speech. He did
not focus on the harm to the individual; rather he was concerned that if such speech went
unchecked it would harm democratic institutions. Dissenting in Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1 (1948), he wrote:
[W]e must bear in mind also that no serious outbreak of mob violence, race riot-
ing, lynching or public disorder is likely to get going without help of some
speech-making to some mass of people. A street may be filled with men and wo-
men and the crowd still not be a mob. Unity of purpose, passion and hatred,
which merges the many minds of a crowd into the mindlessness of a mob, almost
invariably is supplied by speeches. It is naive, or worse, to teach that oratory with
this object or effect is a service to liberty. No mob has ever protected any liberty,
even its own, but if not put down it always winds up in an orgy of lawlessness
which respects no liberties.
Id. at 32. Justice Jackson alluded to the misuse of liberty by those, like Goebbels, who had
only disdain for the democracy, and continued:
In the long run, maintenance of free speech will be more endangered if the popu-
lation can have no protection from the abuses which lead to violence. No liberty
is made more secure by holding that its abuses are inseparable from its enjoy-
ment .... The choice is not between order and liberty. It is between liberty with
order and anarchy without either.
Id. at 37.
8. The two most celebrated civil suits against white supremecists were brought after
a young black man, Michael Donald, was lynched in Alabama, and an Ethiopian student,
Mulugeta Seraw, was kicked to death in Portland, Washington. In both cases, Morris Dees,
of the Southern Poverty Law Center, sought damages which were designed to "compen-
sate" the victims' parents and to drive the hate groups involved out of business. See, e.g.,
Don Duncan, $12 Million Bill for Metzger-White Supremacist Must Pay Murder Victim"s Family,
SEATrLE TIMES, Oct. 23, 1990, at BI; FrankJudge, Slaying the Dragon, AM. LAw., Sept. 1987,
at 83;Jesse Kornbluth, The Woman Who Beat the Klan, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 1, 1987, at 23;
Richard E. Meyer, The Long Crusade, L.A. TIMES MAG., Dec. 3, 1989, at 14.
9. See ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING My ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS, THE SKOKIE CASE AND
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ther King's Birthday erupted into violence as young people reacted to
the presence of the Klan.' 0 Most recently, on the eve of the verdict in
the Rodney King case, street gangs in Los Angeles shouted, "No justice,
no peace."" Two years before the riots, my son threw a classmate up
THE RISKS OF FREEDOM (1979) (describing the lawsuit and the events leading up to the day
when the march occurred). When the march was eventually held, members of the Na-
tional Socialist Party in America, led by Frank Collin, were pelted with rocks and eggs.
10. On a day when more than 15,000 people turned out to honor the memory of
Martin Luther King, the Klan planned a rally which was attended by 125 Klan members.
The speeches by Klan leaders were heard by the faithful, the news media and counter-
demonstrators who were on hand to protest the Klan rally. The leaders were spirited
away, the Klan faithful fled through sub-basement tunnels under city buildings to a waiting
bus. They were protected by the police as they entered the van and the protestors began
throwing bottles and snowballs. Twenty-one of the protestors, six of whom were
juveniles, were arrested by the police. It was reported that one protestor made the follow-
ing comment about the racism of the police: "Those (expletive deleted) don't protect
black people in their own neighborhood," but "[t]hey come out in record numbers to
protect the KKK." John C. Ensslin & Mark Brown, King Day Observance Explodes into a Riot,
Confrontation is Worst in U.S. as Nation Honors Civil Rights Leader Who Preached Non-violence,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,Jan. 21, 1991, at 6, 20 (the author of this article did not delete the
expletive nor did the editors of the Denver University Law Review. It was deleted from the
newspaper account of the disturbance). The newspaper report also described the protes-
ters as "a ragtag collection of several hundred gang members, drunks and thugs" that
went after the Klan and then the police. Id. at 6. Other reports referred to them as young
people who did not understand Martin Luther King's message. Brian Weber, King's Legacy
Lost on Youth, Webb Says, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 22, 1992, at 8. Many of the "activ-
ists" blamed federal judge, U.S. District Court Judge Richard P. Matsch, for granting a
permit to the Klan. Robert Jackson, Violence Came as 'No Surprise', ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
Jan. 22, 1992, at 23.
11. The phrase, "No Justice, No Peace," was chanted by many of the residents of
South Central Los Angeles. Arguably, the looting, burning and destruction of property
was attributable to both the lack of justice in the trial and the absence of "economic jus-
tice" within the community. Jonathan Peterson & Hector Tobar, South L.A. Burns and
Grieves, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1992, at Al.
When I first saw the films of the riot and heard the chant, "No Justice, No Peace," it
seemed appropriate. I never stopped to think about the source of the phrase. "NoJustice,
No Peace" has been labeled the "activist mantra." Jonathan Rieder, Crown of Thorns: The
Roots of the Black Jewish Feud, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 14, 1991, at 26. I was surprised, I sup-
pose, by the level of political consciousness it revealed. Somehow I did not expect that
from young people living in poverty. I expected passivity, lethargy, hedonism and hope-
lessness; I expected something that looked like the "culture of poverty" academics and
politicians decry. See, e.g., FRANK LEVY, DOLLARS AND DREAMS: THE CHANGING AMERICAN
INCOME DISTRIBUTION (1987) (Discussing the culture of poverty and the attributes associ-
ated with this "culture," as lifted from the preface to Oscar Lewis', LA VIDA). Levy also
explores the intergenerational transmission of poverty; a theory which has currency in the
1990s and which relies heavily on the rhetoric of pop psychology, exhorting the welfare
system for creating dependency. See also LEE RAINWATER & WILLIAM L. YANCY, THE MOYNI-
HAN REPORT AND THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY (1987) (discussing the work of Daniel
Patrick Moynihan). I saw John Singleton's BoYz IN THE HOOD (Columbia Pictures 1991),
but I too should have been listening to rap music. See, e.g., Havelock Nelson, Hip-Hop
Offered Tip-Off on Urban Unrest, BILLBOARD, May 23, 1992, at 22 ("[R]ap acts like Public
Enemy, X-Clan, Too Short, 2Pac, N.W.A., Intelligent Hoodlum, Sister Souljah, Ice-T, and
Ice Cube have been pairing the pain and frustrations of black life with bleak, bristling
soundscapes that scream 'No justice, no peace!'-aural visions of burning buildings and
smashed glass, boiling protests and 'smoked pork' (violence against the police).").
I tried to trace the phrase, "No Justice, No Peace" back to its origins. It was in use
when Gavin Cato died in Crown Heights and was written on a sign at the sidewalk shrine
to him. There are reports that the mob that killed Yenkel Rosenbaum shouted both "Kill
the Jew " and "No Justice, No Peace." This disturbs me. There is no real understanding
of oppression if the phrase is used so inappropriately; one oppressed group shouting ra-
cial epithets at another. See David Evanier, Invisible Man: The Lynching of Yankel Rosenbaum,
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against a locker for calling someone a nigger.
Each of these responses to prejudice varies in terms of the violence
involved and in the damage done to other human beings, but each was a
violation of the law. I am a lawyer, charged with the responsibility of
defending and upholding the rule of law. Yet I cannot, in good con-
science, commend my son, or any member of those groups affected by
the virulent message of the hate epidemic in our society, to the protec-
tion of the ethic of "civility." Civility means nothing more or less than
unequal justice. Civility means you have no legal recourse. Civility is
just another way of saying that justice in America is not only not color
blind, it is color conscious in the worst possible way.
12
NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 14, 1991, at 21. If the reports of the behavior of the Hassidic commu-
nity in Crown Heights are true; if their patrols assumed the role of the white police; if, as it
is alleged, the Hassidic patrols interrogated "[B]lacks they deem[ed] out of place;" if "they
detained a black youth merely because he was racing for the subway;" or beat another
black youth "to a pulp" because he "allegedly grabbed a man's yarmulke," then the hostil-
ity and the use of the phrase makes more sense. Jonathan Rieder, supra at 30.
Before the Crown Heights incident, there was the incident in Bensonhurst where
Yusef Hawkins was murdered. The banner "No Justice, No Peace" was carried by a crowd
of demonstrators after Keith Modello was acquitted of the murder. It was part of the litany
the crowd chanted after the trial. See Lorrin Anderson, Cracks in the Mosaic, NAT'L REV.,
June 25, 1990, at 36 (An absurd article on "black racism." The "racism" the writer decries
is the hatred of whites. To call that hatred racism is a perversion of the meaning of the
term.). Perhaps the phrase began here at Bensonhurst, an invention of activist Al
Sharpton.
12. It is our consciousness of color that makes us pretend that color does not matter.
Lawyers often play a significant role in challenging this assumption. The summation in a
famous case, the prosecution of eleven Blacks for the murder of a white man serves as an
example. The Sweet trial, as it came to be called, took place in Detroit in 1926. The prose-
cutor argued that race and color had nothing to do with the trial although the man killed
had been part of a mob of white men outside the Sweet home. Clarence Darrow insisted
that race had everything to do with it, and brought that point home over and over again in
his summation. Darrow asked:
Suppose you were colored. Did any of you ever dream that you were colored?
Did you ever wake up out of a nightmare when you dreamed that you were
colored? Would you be willing to have my clients' skin? Why? Just because
somebody is prejudiced! Imagine yourselves colored, gentlemen. Imagine your-
selves back in the Sweet house on that fatal night.
Clarence Darrow, Summation in the Sweet Case, in LAw As LITERATURE 346, 358 (Ephraim
London ed., 1960). He returns to the theme again:
Here were eleven colored men, penned up in the house. Put yourselves in their
place. Make yourself colored for a while. It won't hurt, you can wash it off. They
can't, but you can; just make yourself black for a little while; long enough, gentle-
men, to judge them and before any of you would want to be judged, you would
want your juror to put himself in your place. That is all I ask in this case. They
were black, they knew the history of the black.
Id. at 366. Once again, Darrow reiterates:
I should imagine that the only thing that two or three colored people talk of when
they get together is race. I imagine that they can't rub color off their faces or rub
it out of their minds. I imagine that it is with them always. I imagine that stories
of lynching, the stories of murders, the stories of oppression are a topic of con-
stant conversation .... Suppose you were black. Do you think you would forget
it even in your dreams? Or would you have black dreams?
Id.
When we avoid the issue of color, it is because we know racism is dangerous and
wrong. But ignoring the prejudice that exists in society is one way of insuring its contin-
ued vitality. For that reason, neutral principles are insidious and dangerous. When the
doctrines or legal rules applied are "neutral," the result in a case seems legitimate and,
even more importantly, it seems "principled," a characteristic which is highly valued in our
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Sometime after his confrontation with this classmate, Chris began
having nightmares. In one, he recognized a building as his school, but
there were gurneys in the hallways. The patient on the nearest gurney
had no head. A big schoolbus was parked outside the building and it
had a sign across the front which read "DETENTION." Christopher
told me that he was frightened. He was afraid that the bus was there to
take him away.
I never taught my son to be afraid. When he experienced racism, he
learned to be afraid. Racism is experienced as fear. The touch and the
taste of it, manifested in the sweat on your palms, the dry feeling in your
mouth, the apprehension that makes your stomach go sour, is fear.'
3
These sensations are grounded in a visceral understanding of the nature
of racism. Racism is expressed through violence, or in its less extreme
forms, in actions which are designed to humiliate.14 One escapes from
legal system. Most of us think that equal justice under the law means that those who have
wealth and privilege are not immune from attack. In reality, inequality is embedded in the
law, and the only result achieved by neutrality in the application of the law, is the preserva-
tion of that inequality. See, e.g., J. Skelly Wright, The Courts Have Failed the Poor, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Mar. 9, 1969, at 26. One of the themes which can be found in Critical Race Theory
is the criticism of the idea of a 'colorblind' or neutral law. See, e.g., Anthony E. Cook, The
Temptation and Fall of Original Understanding, 1990 DUKE L. J. 1163 (1990) (reviewing ROB-
ERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1989));
Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimization in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1331 (1988). For an interesting discussion of
race as culture and the unwillingness of the courts to confront that issue see Neil Gotanda,
A Critique of Our Constitution is Color-Blind, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991-92) and Paulette Cald-
well, A Hair Piece." Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365 (1991)
(white aesthetics are involved in employer regulation of hair styles, and a decision which
found this rule to be neutral overlooked the physical and cultural differences between men
and women, Blacks and Whites, and the intersection of two forms of hegemony in the
treatment of black women).
The myth of neutrality is particularly dangerous in areas of the law where the effects
of racism are not immediately apparent. I teach partnership law and I have always been
bothered by the absence of race in cases. I can find cases which reveal attitudes about class
and gender, but I cannot find cases which mention race. I could speculate that courts
would not classify a black person as a partner, but without a case in which a court discussed
the race of the participants in a business, how could I prove it? Then I found Butler v.
State, 111 S.W. 146 (Ct. Crim. App. 1908), a criminal case involving a charge of embezzle-
ment. The defendant offered partnership as a defense. He lost this argument because
neither the court nor the defendant himself was willing to say that a white man and a black
man could be partners. I would never have known the reason for the holding in the case; I
would never have understood the failure by the court to follow a line of precedent which
would have dictated a different result, if not for a dissent which adopted verbatim the brief
of defense counsel, James H. Hart, which discussed honestly and openly the effect of race
and racism on everyone involved in the case, including the defendant. Butler, 111 S.W. at
148 (Davidson, P. J. dissenting).
13. The same physical sensations are described in Charles R. Lawrence, III, A Dream:
On Discovering the Significance of Fear, 10 NOVA L. REV. 627 (1986). Professor Lawrence,
through his response to a question by a character in his dream, discovers that the fear
black people learned in slavery and have carried with them since emancipation is a fear of
physical violence or deprivation, as well as a fear of humiliation, which he calls the fear of
rejection. The fear of the oppressor (mythical and real), created through the act of op-
pression, is both rational and irrational.
14. Racism has as its basic premise the right of one people to dominate another-
predicated on the assumption that the dominant group is superior to the subordinate
group. So racism is always about putting black people in their place, teaching them not to
be "uppity." This is often accomplished through humiliation. I remember how humili-
ated I felt, how incredibly angry I was, to pick up the New York Times and see black men in
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the fear only to discover the meaning of anger.
A few years ago while I was collecting oral histories in Houston, an
elderly black woman described her memories of Jim Crow to me: "Our
parents never told us not to ride in the front of the bus. They didn't tell
us to stay away from the water fountains that were marked 'White.' We
just knew." 1 5 Black children sensed the presence of danger; they knew
enough to be afraid. She also described the "riot" by the black soldiers
from Fort Logan in the summer of 1917.16 She remembered black
soldiers marching through the streets of the Fourth Ward in disciplined
fashion-in military formation. She told me that the riot began when a
bus driver insisted that one of the soldiers sit in the back of the bus.
17
their shorts with their hands up against a wall, their clothing apparently in a pile off to one
side. The photographers and the news media had been invited to a raid of three Black
Panther centers by the Philadelphia police. If the purpose had been to show that the
Panthers were dangerous; if the search for concealed weapons was prudent, why did it all
take place in the street and in full view of the cameras? Police Commissioner Frank Rizzo
wanted to humiliate these men and he succeeded. Donald Janson, Panthers Raided in Phila-
delphia, N.Y. TIMES , 25 Sept. 1, 1970, at Al, A25.
When I try to make people understand what racism is all about, I often resort to a
speech which was given by Ms. Edith King, President of the Coalition of 100 Black Wo-
men, in Houston, Texas at the opening of the Women of Courage Exhibit. Ms. King intro-
duced Rosa Parks, the guest of honor at the opening. The photographs from the Exhibit
can be found in ARTHUR AND ELIZABETH SCHLESSINGER LIBRARY ON THE HISTORY OF WO-
MEN IN AMERICA, RADCLIFFE COLLEGE, WOMEN OF COURAGE: A CATALOG OF AN EXHIBITION
OF PHOTOGRAPHS, (Radcliffe College 1984) (based on the Black Women Oral History Pro-
ject sponsored by the Arthur and Elizabeth Schlessinger Library on the History of Women
in America, Radcliffe College. The exhibit was of photographs of Judith Sedwick). Ms.
King had this to say about Mrs. Rosa Parks:
Perhaps now her act seems a small thing. But to those of us who rode in the back
of the bus, who stood silently while others sat; to those of us who remember the
indignation of no public restrooms and other facilities; to those of us who remem-
ber carrying just a little fear with us always; for all the missed carnivals, plays,
concerts and trips to the library and all the other small things that demeaned us
daily-this act was and is the height of courage. For Mrs. Rosa Parks quietly did
what each of us wished we had the courage to do.
Edith King, Sept. 5, 1985, given at Julia Ideson Public Library, Houston, Texas. (on file
with author).
Humiliation was institutionalized in the South. However, the absence of segregation
in the North did not mean that we who were raised in the North were free from the effects
of racism or the techniques of racists.
15. In connection with the Women of Courage Project, I interviewed several black
women and prepared their biographies for the opening night ceremonies honoring their
contributions to the community. Among them was Mrs. Martha Countee White, the
granddaughter of Jack Yates, founder of the Antioch Baptist Church and community
leader before and after Emancipation. I cannot be sure that Ms. White told me this story;
it could have been any of the number of women or men I interviewed for the project.
16. There are many parallels which can be drawn between the riots in Los Angeles
and the riots in Houston. See generally ROBERT V. HAYNES, A NIGHT OF VIOLENCE: THE
HOUSTON RIOT OF 1917 (1976); JOHN M. LINDLEY, A SOLDIER IS ALSO A CITIZEN: THE
CoNTROVERSY OVER MILITARY JUSTICE 1917-1920 (1990) (an account of the effect of the
court martials which followed on military justice). Camp Logan is also a play by Celeste
Bedford Walker which has been presented at Wellesley College and at the Terrace Thea-
tre in Washington, D.C. See Matthew Gilbert, Camp Logan Filled with Ensemble Power, THE
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 9, 1991, at 75 (reviewing the production); Pamela Sommers, The
Character of Racism, WASH. POST, June 21, 1991, at B2. After the "riot" in Houston, 156
black soldiers were tried for mutiny, murder and riot. JOHN M. LINDLEY, supra at 8.
17. See HAYNES, supra note 16, at 90-114; LINDLEY, supra note 16, at 13-15 (describing
the events of the day of the riot). Most Whites and Blacks would be surprised to learn that
long before the bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama, Blacks had engaged in boycotts to
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History reports other reasons for the riot. Some say that it began when
a black soldier was beaten by a white police officer. 18
It does not really matter to me which of the two incidents precipi-
tated the incident. What does matter is the reaction of the young black
men to the injustice ofJim Crow; and the reaction of the white commu-
nity to the rebellion of those young black men. 19 Seventeen whites were
killed, four of them police officers. Twenty-three young black men were
executed, thirteen of them hung and buried in secret, unmarked graves
and many more were imprisoned.
20
protest the segregated seating on street cars. See HAYNES, supra note 16, at 28 & n.43
(citing August Meier & Elliot Rudwick, The Boycott Movement AgainstJim Crow Street Cars in the
South, 1900-1906, J. AM. HISTORY, Mar. 1969, LX & 756-75).
18. See generally HAYNES, supra note 16, at 30-31 (discussing the use of force by police
and the disparate treatment accorded black citizens in a moral crusade designed to rid
Houston of prostitutes and bootleggers). The account which appears in the official re-
ports issued after the investigation of the events that day describe not one, but two occa-
sions when two Houston policemen beat, and then arrested, black soldiers. The first was
an unarmed solder, Private Edwards. The police later detained Corporal Baltimore. A
great many of the police apparently made it a practice to call the black soldiers "nigger."
LINDLEY, supra note 16, at 13. The reports were unanimous in assigning much blame to
the police for what happened that day. See id. at 7-36, discussing the three reports on the
Houston riots: COL. GEORGE 0. CRESS, INVESTIGATION OF THE TROUBLE AT HOUSTON,
TEXAS BETWEEN THIRD BATrALION, 24TH INFANTRY AND CITIZENS OF HOUSTON, AUG. 23,
1917 (1917) (available at Old Military Records Division, Records of United States Army
Continental Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393, File 370.61, National Archives
Building, Washington, D.C.); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED
PEOPLE, THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED
PEOPLE in CRISIS 15 (Nov. 15, 1917); MAJ. KNEELAND S. SNOW, REPORT ON THE CIRCUM-
STANCES A-TrENDING THE MUTINY (1917).
Sixty years later, in 1977, the Houston police murdered a Mexican-American, Joe
Campos Torres. In the words of one of the police, they beat him up and threw him into
Buffalo Bayou "to see if the wetback could swim." Bill Curry, 4 Ex-Policemen Indicted in
Death of Tex. Prisoner, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1977, at A13. When the state trial resulted in a
one-year sentence and a $2000 fine for each of the defendants, the Carter administration
reversed a ban on federal prosecutions for civil rights violations on which state action had
been taken, a policy that had existed from the time of the Eisenhower Administration. Id.
The federal prosecutors did not fare much better. The defendants in the federal trial were
convicted, but Judge Ross Sterling gave them a ten-year suspended sentence for depriving
Torres of his civil rights and a one-year jail term for a separate misdemeanor. Jerrold K.
Footlick, Houston Justice, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 17, 1978, at 122. In 1985, the predominantly
white police force in Houston vowed to embarrass and humiliate Police Chief Lee Brown,
who is black, at a meeting of the International Association of Police Chiefs in Houston.
Wayne King, Police Union Vows to "Humiliate" Houston's Chief at World Meeting, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 6, 1985, at A13.
19. Six months after the riot, Ted Koppel interviewed the people who live in South
Central Los Angeles. Once again, I was surprised at the level of political awareness among
the general population, young and old, women and men. This awareness manifested itself
in young men who characterized the events of April 26, 1992, as a rebellion, not a riot. All
agreed that they would like to rebuild their community, but they could not rebuild without
resources; they could not survive without jobs; and the inaction on the part of the govern-
ment (which is a stand-in for the white majority) would result, ultimately, in even more
violence. Nightline (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 21, 1992). See also After the Riots: The
Search for Answers; Tucker Says the Status Quo Must Change, L.A. TIMES, May 8, 1992, at A6
(Assemblyman from Los Angeles issues prediction that if the status quo remained the
same, "we'll burn this state down.").
20. The army separated the soldiers who were to be tried into three groups. The first
group consisted of 63 men. Thirteen were tried and hung; only five were acquitted. Forty-
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Things have not changed much since 1917.21 A fear of black men
still dwells in the collective unconscious of America. The verdict in the
Rodney King case legitimized that fear. The videotape of the violent
attack on a white truck driver will, no doubt, lead to the conviction of the
young gang members who are alleged to have participated in that at-
tack.2 2 The swiftness with which justice will be meted out in their case is
also an expression of that fear. In a way, this fear, the very vehemence
of the condemnation of the riots, is an admission that young black men
have reason to be angry. The condemnation is a warning that rebellion
will not be tolerated.
My son was willing to take responsibility for defending his dignity
and the dignity of the only other black student in his class. He knew
without my telling him, that his actions, which we both considered justi-
fied, would put him at risk of punishment. The decision in the Rodney
King case, and the events that followed, only confirmed what we both
knew: penalties are exacted for acts of defiance, when pride makes sub-
mission impossible. The soldiers from Camp Logan were hung, and
Rodney King was beaten because he refused to submit. I would wager
that the gang members will receive harsh prison sentences. In his
dream, Chris was afraid of the punishment for the crime that he felt he
committed. After all, someone lay headless and mute. Who but Chris-
topher could be responsible for this? But what would his dream have
been if he had done otherwise; if he stood by without defending himself
or others from racist attacks?
Last summer, a friend told me about a young black child, a ten year-
old, who struggled with his own passivity in a situation where a black
classmate was beaten by white boys in their class. The image of all of
one received life sentences, and four received shorter terms of imprisonment. LINDLEY,
supra note 16, at 18.
Eventually, the life sentences were commuted after public outcry over the secrecy sur-
rounding the first court martial and the lack of appeal from the sentences. A DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 1910-1932 332 (Herbert
Aptheker, ed., 1990). The NAACP worked to obtain the parole of those men who were
sentenced to prison; and finally in 1938, the last of them was released. One account of the
struggle of the NAACP on their behalf describes the events of September 28, 1921 when
James Weldon Johnson, then Secretary of the NAACP, had an audience with President
Harding and presented a petition signed by 50,000 persons asking for the pardon of 61
soldiers confined in Levinworth as a result of the 1917 riot. Id. at 334.
21. See, Nathaniel Jones, Introduction, 70 DENv. U. L. REV. 195 (1993).
22. The Messenger, a monthly magazine published by A. Philip Randolph and Chandler
Owen published an editorial in January, 1918 concerning the administration of justice in
the case of the black soldiers from Camp Logan. APTHEKER, supra note 20, at 195. The
editorial in The Messenger compared the treatment received by white soldiers who shot and
wounded Blacks in East St. Louis to the treatment given the men of the 24th Regiment in
Houston. In the former case, no soldiers were apprehended or tried; in the latter, thirteen
of the black soldiers were tried, denied the right of appeal, executed in secret and buried
in unmarked graves. Id. at 196-97.
It seems that vengeance and justice are the right of only the white majority. We shall
see whether justice tempers the punishment in the case of the young black men in Los
Angeles, or whether, in the words ofJames Weldon Johnson, their trials bear the "aspect
of visitation upon their color rather than upon their crime." James Weldon Johnson,
Speech Delivered to President Harding (1921), reprinted in ArHEKER, supra note 20, at 334.
The occasion for the speech is discussed supra note 20.
[Vol. 70:2
1993] RIOTS AND THE RULE OF LAW
these young white boys in a circle around a black youngster on the
ground, kicking him and yelling racial epithets, made my blood run cold.
I found it incredibly sad that a young black boy could find himself stand-
ing on the periphery, witnessing a brutal attack, unsure of how he
should respond. There was a punishment imposed in that case after the
parents of the black child called the police and had them investigate the
incident. The school suspended two or three of the white boys who
were thought to have goaded the mob of boys into violence. It also sus-
pended the black student who had been beaten. It all began, you see,
because he pushed another boy on the playground.
2 3
Both Chris, who chose to act, and his young friend, who chose not
to act, understood intuitively that defending who they were would put
them at risk. The risk exists because racism distorts the perception of
right and wrong; it realigns responsibility and blame, shifting both from
those who hate to those who are hated. 2 4 In the Rodney King case, spe-
cious arguments about control shifted responsibility from the mob that
attacked the man to the man who was attacked.2 5 Actually, the shift was
23. I heard of the incident from a child and from several parents whose children at-
tended an elementary school in Rolling Hills, California, a suburb of Los Angeles. In an
unrelated incident that same month, the older child in this same family described a flier
shown to him by a "friend" which compared the head of an ape to the head of a black man
and in pseudo-scientific form presented statistics which proved the biological connection
between the two.
24. Defense attorney John Barnett explained that the strategy in the Rodney King
case was to make the jury "feel" something, to "put the jury in the shoes of the police
officer and make them feel what they felt, what it's like to be an officer at 11:45 p.m. on
Foothill Avenue." John Riley, Inside the King Case, Part I: What the Jury Heard That the Public
Didn't, NEWSDAY, May 13, 1992, at 17. For another startling example of misplaced, but
natural, empathy, see THE TIMES OF HARVEY MILK (Pacific Arts Video 1986) (copy on file
with author). A voice-over describes the reaction of the jury that watched the videotaped
confession of the man who killed Mayor George Moscone and Harvey Milk, a gay rights
activist and city official. The jury cried as Dan White broke down and explained that he
had been under pressure. He killed Harvey Milk after killing the Mayor because Harvey
Milk "smirked" when Dan White showed up at his office.
25. See Kimberle Crenshaw & Gary Peller, Reel Time/Real Justice, 70 DENv. U. L. REV.
283 (1993) (discussing disaggregated narrative). It is hard to say which was more perni-
cious, the strong pull of the identity between the defendant and the jury, or willingness to
assign fault to the victim. The defense emphasized the fact that Rodney King rose after
the first attack and lunged toward one of the police officers. A juror on The Today Show
(NBC television broadcast, Apr. 31, 1992) stated that Rodney King was "directing the
action." According to the juror, "even during the handcuffing, he was still fighting. Dur-
ing the process he was laughing and uttering sounds. No, he was in complete control."
Lee A. Daniels, Riots in Los Angeles: The Jury; Some Identified as Jurors Aren't in Accord on TV,
N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1992, at A23. Retta Kossow, ajuror who was interviewed on CBS News
(CBS television broadcast, Apr. 30, 1992) repeated that argument: "I am thoroughly con-
vinced, as were the others, I believe, that Mr. King was in full control of the whole situa-
tion at all times. He was not writhing in pain. He was moving to get away from the officers
and he gave every indication he was on PCP." Nina Bernstein, Bitter Dispute injury Room;
How 12 Ordinary Citizens Met For 7 Days to Produce the Verdict that Shook L.A., NEWSDAY, May
14, 1992, at 5. Her husband added in another interview that his wife felt sorry for Mr.
King, "[b]ut how about the police officers? Their lives were completely ruined because
Mr. King wanted to go out and have a good time." Id. Despite Ms. Kossow's protesta-
tions, not all the jurors agreed. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra (report of juror who called the
Donahue show sobbing).
The control theory offered by the defense was about as preposterous as the theory
used by the defense in the Milk case: Dan White had been suffering from a depression
brought on by eating junk food. In the King case, the defense sought to make the victim
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more subtle than that. It was a shift to the idea of what Rodney King
represents, the potential for violence which lies dormant in all who are
oppressed. Do not expect symmetry in the law where gang members are
concerned. There will be no shift of guilt from the mob we witnessed
attacking a white victim to the idea that white victims represented, the
group that discriminates against Blacks and refused to convict even the
police officer who rained fifty-six blows on Rodney King.2
6
The morning after the riots began, there was a picture of a black
minister on the morning news. 2 7 It showed him as the verdict was an-
nounced. A single tear rolled down his face. He epitomized the disillu-
sionment that Blacks feel. The Civil Rights Movement and the legal
strategies devised by Charles Hamilton Houston,2 8 pursued by Justice
Thurgood Marshall and Judge Constance Baker Motley, and legal victo-
ries like Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka 29 and the Civil Rights Act of
1964,30 led us to believe that the law could be the instrument of reform;
a means of achieving real equality, or at least freedom from discrimina-
tion. Now, we know better. We hear the voice of racism in the decisions
of a Supreme Court that refuse to provide a remedy when defendants
say "We are not racist," even when their conduct can reasonably be
responsible for what happened to him. In the Milk case, the defense succeeded in convinc-
ing the jury that sugar was responsible for what happened. Sugar was the official culprit,
but Dan White's confession blamed Harvey Milk for his own death. Perhaps they were
persuaded that Harvey Milk was the source of Dan White's fall from political grace and
that he was so arrogant that he literally asked (with that now infamous smirk) for his own
death.
The strategy employed so successfully in both cases is part of a larger phenomenon,
which is the criticism of the "victim" mentality or ideology. See, e.g., SHELBY STEELE, CON-
TENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN AMERICA (1990). Professor Steele
seems to have the corner on the market when it comes to articles on race that appear in
Harpers Magazine. His most recent effort, written after the riots in Los Angeles, is a further
attack on what he calls the orthodoxy of the diversity movement. He dismisses those who
continue to fight injustice in this society as the work of those who are interested in self-
aggrandizement; as "the narcissism of victims," power purchased at the "exorbitant price
of continued victimhood." Shelby Steele, The New Sovereignty: Grievance Groups Have Become
Nations Unto Themselves, HARPERS, July 1992, at 47-54. See generally the discussion of the
use of the "rhetoric of poverty," the persistence over time of the practice of blaming the
victims of poverty for their condition, particularly the use of this rhetoric in Supreme
Court decisions in Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79
GEO. L.J. 1499 (1991).
26. I think it was probably a Freudian slip by the black prosecutor when he described
the jurors as people who "believe there is a thin blue line separating law-abiding citizens
from the jungle-the criminal element." Nina Bernstein, supra note 25, at 31. Although
the District Attorney did not call the jurors racist, his metaphor certainly calls up the lan-
guage of racism: the classification of Blacks as animals, one step removed from their sim-
ian relatives. Perhaps he was still thinking about Officer Powell's description of a domestic
dispute as "something right out of Gorillas in the Mist." Riley, supra note 24, at 17.
27. The Today Show (NBC television broadcast, Apr. 29, 1992).
28. Judge Leon Higginbotham refers to Charles Hamilton Houston as "the chief engi-
neer and the first major architect on the twentieth century civil rights legal scene." Judge
A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Foreword, in GENNA RAE McNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES
HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS at XV (1983). Judge Higginbot-
ham turns the jungle metaphor on its head when he refers to the "jungle of racism toler-
ated by the American Legal Process." Id.
29. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (1981 & Supp. 1992).
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viewed as racist;3 ' which is philosophically opposed to remedial legisla-
tion based on race;3 2 whose neutrality protects those who threaten to
31. See generally TRIBE, supra note 6, § § 16-20 (discussing the discriminatory purpose
requirement). Professor Tribe has entitled one section "The Problem of Discriminatory
Purpose: When Reservations About Remedies Masquerade as Questions About the Exist-
ence of Constitutional Violations." Id. at 1502. While I would not presume to dispute the
point with Professor Tribe, I have to confess that I would not be so charitable in ascribing
motive. When now Chief Justice Rehnquist first described his judicial philosophy as
"majoritarian," I read that as a statement of his political philosophy; a description of his
allegiance and his commitment to hold the line in a political struggle. John A. Jenkins, The
Partisan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1986, § 6 (magazine), at 28, 32.
The rejection of a "disparate impact" test for one which looks for fault on the part of
the state, the "perpetrator perspective," is another example of the aversion to the idea of
collective guilt. See TRIBE, supra note 6, at 1509 (citing Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing
Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Laws: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doc-
trine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052-54 (1978). See also the discussion of collective guilt
infra note 50 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause so that it is a deter-
rent not to racism, but to the overt expression of that racism. In a society where people
have learned that it is important to deny their racism it is virtually impossible to prove
discriminatory intent.
Although the Court has held that discriminatory intent can be shown by circumstantial
evidence, that burden is very difficult to meet. See Crenshaw & Peller, supra note 25. Com-
pare Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (no discrimi-
natory purpose in zoning ordinance) with Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985)
(provision in Alabama Constitution which disenfranchised those convicted of crimes of
moral turpitude was unconstitutional). As my colleague Professor Martin A. Schwartz
pointed out, if the Court really wanted to find discriminatory intent based on circumstan-
tial evidence, it could have done so in death penalty cases. See Susan Waite Crump, Lock-
hart v. McCree: The "Biased but Unbiased Juror, " What Are the States' Legitimate Interests, 65
DENY. U. L. REV. 1 (1988); Regina M. Harris, Note, McCleskey v. Kemp: The Shadow of Racism
on the Capital Sentencing Process, 8 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 173 (1987); Randall L. Kennedy, McCles-
key v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388 (1988);
Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Choosing Those Who Will Die: Race and the Death Pen-
alty, 43 FLA. L. REV. 1 (1991); RonaldJ. Tabak, Is Racism Irrelevant? Or Should the Fairness in
Death Sentencing Act Be Enacted to Substantially Diminish Racial Discrimination in Capital Sentenc-
ing, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 777 (1990-91); Mary Elizabeth Holland, Note, Mc-
Cleskey v. Kemp: Racism and the Death Penalty, 20 CONN. L. REV. 1029 (1988);
The more recent cases distinguish between private and public discrimination; which
relieves the state of responsibility for segregation when it reflects the "natural" preference
of private individuals. See Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992). Racism becomes a part
of our human condition, a cultural artifact which is indistinguishable from other less harm-
ful preferences-for example, the preference of living in a brownstone or rowhouse or co-
op, or in a Georgian, ranch style or tudor home, or living in a neighborhood with Blacks or
without Blacks. Racism is something which we cannot remedy as a society because the
state cannot be blamed for the preferences of individuals. The state is not a person, it is a
collection of institutions acting through people for the benefit of people, it is the means of
expressing and implementing our collective will. Properly viewed, it should be seen as an
appropriate resting place for our collective guilt. The burden then falls on the state, as the
representative of our entire community to discourage prejudice and to act affirmatively to
remedy the harm which has been caused in the aggregate by individual actions.
32. The use of the shibboleth "Our Constitution is Color Blind," has been used to
attack minority set-aside programs and other affirmative action programs. See, e.g., Patter-
son v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (limiting the scope of federal civil rights
legislation, the Court found no remedy under § 1981 for discrimination which was alleged
to have occurred after the contract was formed); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989) (minority set-aside program for Richmond, Virginia was unconstitutional).
There may be a different standard applied when Congress specifically endorses a pol-
icy of affirmative action. See Metromedia Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990)
(Congress responded to an executive decision to curtail the affirmative action policy of the
FCC by adding a provision to an appropriation bill which prevented the change in policy).
For a discussion of the ideological divide between the majority and the dissent see Patricia
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harm us;3 3 and that has a Black man who has so identified with the op-
pressor that he would allow a white prison guard to beat someone who
is the image of himself.3 4 The minister's tears and mine were a measure
of the depth of our mutual despair; our grief when we both realized, he,
the layman and me, the lawyer, that the law has no power against racism.
I cried when I heard the decision in the Rodney King case. I was
angry at the perversion of the rule of law; at the immoral shifting of
responsibility and realignment of right and wrong. The jury was asked
to determine whether the police used "excessive force."'3 5 Ultimately,
that determination involved some assessment of whether the police be-
haved reasonably. 3 6 The "reasonable person" test is an article of faith
among lawyers and lay people. "Reasonableness" is an idea that is at
Williams, Comment, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.- Regrouping the Singular Times, 104 HARv.
L. REV. 525 (1990).
33. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (invalidating ordinance
which criminalized behavior that threatened minorities).
34. Hudson v. McMillan, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992). See Linda Greenhouse, High Court
Defines New Limit on Force By a Prison Guard, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1992, at AI; Ruth Marcus,
High Court Extends Curb Against Beating Prisoners; Ruling Represents a Rare Victory for Inmates,
WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1992, at A4; Ira Mickenberg, Court Clarifies Indefinite Issues In Criminal
Law Cases, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 31, 1992, at S6 (discussing the incongruity between Thomas'
dissent in Hudson v. McMillan, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) and his
testimony at confirmation hearings at which he noted his identification with the prisoners
who passed by his office in the court of appeals); Martin A. Schwartz, The Prisoner Beating
Case, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 21, 1992, at 3. See also Dale E. Butler, Comment, Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Takes One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, 70 DENY. U. L. REV. 393 (1993).
35. The jury instructions in People v. Powell are seventeen pages long. See People v.
Powell, Jury Instructions, available in LEXIS, California Library, L.A.P.D. File. The four
counts on which the defendants were tried were explained in some detail. Count I
charged Officers Powell, Wind and Briseno (who argued that his use of force was in de-
fense of another, namely, Rodney King) with violation of California Penal Code
§ 245(A)(1). CAL. CODE § 245(a)(1) (West 1988 & Supp 1993) (Assault with deadly
weapon or force likely to produce great bodily injury; punishment). Count II alleged a
violation of California Penal Code § 149, CAL. CODE § 149 (West 1988) (Officer unneces-
sarily assaulting or beating any person) making it unlawful for any public officer who,
under cover of authority and without lawful necessity, to assault or beat any person.
Count III charged Powell with filing a false police report. CAL. CODE § 118.1 (West Supp.
1993) (Peace officer's false report). Count IV charged Officer Stacey C. Koon with filing a
false police report. CAL. CODE § 118.1. Count V charged Officer Koon with being an
accessory in the commission of a felony in violation of California Penal Code § 32. CAL.
CODE § 32 (West 1988) (Accessories defined). The indictment is available in LEXIS, Cal.
Library, LAPD file.
36. With respect Count II (officer unnecessarily assaulting or beating another per-
son), the judge stated:
In making an arrest the officer may subject the person being arrested to such
restraint as is reasonable for the arrest and detention. A peace officer who is
making an arrest may use reasonable force to make such arrest or to prevent
escape or to overcome resistance.
Where a peace officer is making an arrest, the person being arrested-and
the person being arrested has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care,
should have knowledge that he is being arrested by a peace officer and such peace
officer is making an arrest, it is the duty of the person to refrain from using force
or other means to resist such arrest unless unreasonable or excessive force is
being used to make the arrest.
However, a peace officer is not permitted to use unreasonable or excessive
force in making an otherwise lawful arrest. If an officer does use unreasonable or
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the heart of our legal system.3 7 It is central to the belief in the morality
of the law itself.38 The verdict is immoral because racism has been legit-
excessive force in making or attempting to make an arrest, the person being ar-
rested may use reasonable force to protect himself against such excessive force.
As I have stated, a peace officer who is making a lawful arrest may use reason-
able force to make such arrest or to prevent escape or to overcome resistance.
It is lawful for a peace officer to use force in the arrest if a reasonable peace
officer in the same or similar circumstances would believe that such force is neces-
sary to make the arrest or to prevent escape or to overcome resistance. In doing
so, such peace officer may use that force and means that a reasonable peace of-
ficer, in the same or similar circumstances, would believe to be necessary to make
such arrest or to prevent escape or to overcome resistance.
The right of a peace officer to use reasonable force exists only so long as it
would appear to a reasonable peace officer, in the same or similar circumstances,
that that force is necessary to make such arrest or to prevent escape or to over-
come resistance.
When that force would no longer appear to a reasonable peace officer, in the
same or similar circumstances, to be necessary, the right to use reasonable force
no longer exists and the use of such force is not reasonable. The use of force that
is not reasonable is unlawful and without lawful necessity.
The people have the burden to prove that the force used was not lawful and
without lawful necessity. If you have a reasonable doubt that the use of force was
unlawful and without lawful necessity, you must find the defendant not guilty.
The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer under the same or similar circumstances. The
test of reasonableness is not capable of precise definition or mechanical applica-
tion. It is - its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and
circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue,
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or
others and whether he is actively resisting or attempting to evade arrest by flight.
The question is whether the totality of the circumstances justifies a particular sort
of force.
People v. Powell, Jury Instructions, supra note 35.
37. The notion of reasonableness, and its use as a standard, cuts across the legal
boundary lines. In contract law, we interpret behavior, including words and expressions,
to determine whether a reasonable person would perceive a communication as an offer:
"[T]he 'objective' test affords the courts an opportunity to control or regulate individual
exchange behavior through the use of that great 'collectivist,' the 'reasonable' person."
EDWARDJ. MURPHY & RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 261 (4th ed. 1991).
The Uniform Commercial Code fills the gaps in contracts with reasonable terms: a reason-
able price, § 2-305; delivery is due within a reasonable time, § 2-309; and the parties, if
they are merchants, have a duty to act with commercial reasonableness, § 2-104, cmt. 2.
AMERICAN LAW INST., NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, SELECTED
COMMERCIAL STATUES (12th ed. 1991). Reasonableness is also a benchmark for corporate
directors; the officer or director has to behave in a way which he or she "reasonably"
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation and make the appropriate inquiries
in any situation which would alert a "reasonable" director. AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCI-
PLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, PROPOSED FINAL
DRAFT § 4.01(a) (1992). We have seen how often reasonableness was invoked in the Peo-
ple v. Powell jury instructions on only one of the many counts. See People v. Powell, Jury
Instructions, supra note 35. And, of course, the judge did instruct the jury on the standard
of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
38. See generally LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (revised ed. 1969) (discussing
"[t]he morality that makes law possible"). He also argues that the law must be clear. Id. at
63. I am sure that the reasonable person standard would satisfy his requirements, because
it is, to use his own words, one of a species of "common sense standards ofjudgment that
have grown up in the ordinary life outside legislative halls." Id. at 64. This great collectiv-
ist, the reasonable person, is the standard which dispenses with difference and assumes
assimilation into the dominant culture. See CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 28 (discussing the
reasonable person standard and the effect on diversity). It is unfair and dishonest to ask
people to abide by your rules and then to change the rules because they do not work to
your advantage. I discussed this problem of manipulable standards in an earlier article.
See Deborah Post, Reflections on Identity, Diversity and Morality, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 136
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imated as reasonable, rational human behavior.
I have read about the protests of the jurors who are hurt by the
allegations that they are racist. They claim that the evidence was not so
clear cut. The defense offered an explanation of the beating which was
credible: the police were justified in continuing to use force as long as
Rodney King resisted. His shouts of obscenities, his continued attempts
to stand, his struggle, proved that he was "in control of the action."'3 9 I
have trouble explaining this reasoning to my son. It does not accord
with my understanding of American values: Americans believe that
human beings are rational and should behave accordingly; Americans
have great faith in science and in empirical evidence; and Americans be-
lieve in the efficacy of the law in discerning the truth.
The reasonable person is the connecting tissue that links these vi-
sions. It is one way in which we translate our aspirations for humankind
into a system of ethics. This objective standard, I learned as a law stu-
dent, is a moral yardstick by which we measure our fellow citizens. The
reasonable person is a standard which determines the scope of our re-
sponsibilities to one another. You don't have to be a lawyer to under-
stand the idea that we are responsible for what we know and what we
should know. Purposeful ignorance is no defense. Even Christopher
knows the futility of the "I didn't mean it" defense. Invariably that de-
fense elicits the "You should have known better" judgment.
The jurors could have asked whether the police officers should have
known better. The answer would have been that no reasonable person
in the position of those police officers could have believed that Rodney
King was in control of the situation. For that matter, no reasonable per-
son in the position of those jurors could have exonerated the police af-
ter viewing that videotape. No rational human being could have
disregarded the evidence that jury had before it. Some new and unu-
sual meaning must have been assigned to the images which were cap-
tured on that videotape.
40
(1990-91). Fuller indicated that the most difficult questions arise when the law involves
questions of interpretation. He was discussing the interpretation of the law by courts, but
what he said is equally true when promotion and tenure committees in legal institutions
interpret what "quality" means, or when a jury decides what is "reasonable." When one
interprets behavior or conduct in a way that is contrary to the ordinary understanding of
that behavior, it is a lie. Call that cheating, or a shell game. It is fraud and it is immoral.
Perhaps I should offer you Fuller's version which is more elegant and certainly more po-
lite. He stated that there must be congruence between official action and declared rule,
and noted that one of the dangers to that congruence was the effect of prejudice. FULLER,
supra, at 81.
39. See Bernstein, supra note 25 (discussing the jurors' comments after the verdict).
40. The jury received the following instructions with respect to the expert testimony
which was offered in the case:
[1n rendering an opinion as to the use of force in this case, one or more expert
witnesses expressed an opinion on what physical acts are shown on exhibit 2, the
so called Holliday videotape. Such experts have no more skill than a lay person in
viewing the videotape and determining what it shows in this regard. To the ex-
tent that you find that the videotape is important to you in your deliberations and
decision in this case, you are the sole judges of what physical acts are shown on
this tape.
Jury Instructions, supra note 35. I would say that the judge went pretty far in telling the jury
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In fact, the interpretation the defense offered and the jury em-
braced was based on a novel use of the term "reasonable." It was a
standard of reasonableness that takes race into account unilaterally. The
standard of reasonableness they employed was one which does not ac-
knowledge the reasonableness of the attempt by a black man to escape
the police when they give chase, 4 1 but does acknowledge the justifiabil-
ity of the fear that white cops have of black men. The reasonableness of
the police was measured by something which approaches a subjective
standard; one which attempts to understand and place the actions of the
police in context and to understand the emotions they experienced. 42 It
is a standard of reasonableness that ignores the relative positions of the
two parties, or the superior force, numerical and technological, that the
police enjoyed. 43 It is a standard which presents the police as victims.
to take the expert testimony with a grain of salt. To the extent that the jury (or the eight
people who dominated the jury) interpreted the pictures they saw in a new way, I would
conclude that they wanted to see what was described to them. This is not a case where a
group of people was manipulated by a narrative which grabbed their emotions; a tech-
nique which can be used effectively to create empathy and communicate information about
a reality which is unknown to the person who hears the narrative. This is an example of
people seizing on an explanation which allowed them to reach the result they wanted. But
see Crenshaw & Peller, supra note 25.
41. See Culp, supra note 2 (discussing how to address the "race question" in the court-
room and the "rules of engagement").
42. See a discussion of the defense strategy supra note 24. Most recently, a call was
made for sympathy and understanding in another case of police misconduct. Mr. Rudolph
Giuliani, former and future mayoral candidate in the City of New York, accused Mayor
Dinkins of a double standard when he did not forgive and forget the rampage of police
officers in front of City Hall, police officers who carried signs which referred to Mayor
David Dinkins as a "washroom attendant." Again, this is racism as degradation and humil-
iation. See George James, Police Dept. Report Assails Officers in New York Rally: Disciplining of 42
Is Sought for 'Unruly' Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1992, at AI. Mr. Giuliani contrasted
Mayor Dinkins' behavior towards the police officers as unwarranted in light of his lack of
"zealousness" with regard to "rioting, looting and murder". Some say it was Mr.
Guiliani's intemperate remarks which provoked the lawless behavior by the police. As de-
scribed in one report, Mr. Giuliani "listed a number of Dinkin's policies and after each
one, used a profanity to dismiss them." Todd S. Purdum, Slurs from Police Are Not New to
Dinkins, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1992, at 22. Others attribute the "washroom attendant"
signs to Bob Grant, a talk show host whose venomous attacks on Blacks and gays is legen-
dary. See, e.g., Paul Vitello, What Did He Do To Deserve This? Just Ask Him, Pal, NEWSDAY, May
24, 1992, at 6 (one columnist's comments on the Bob Grant show, sentiments which I
share).
43. Police do not need sympathy. They have power over people's lives. The power of
the police cannot be overstated. Certainly minorities and the mayors of Los Angeles and
New York City, in particular, have learned that lesson from former Los Angeles Police
Chief Daryl F. Gates and the head of the Police Benevolent Association, Phil Caruso. It is
akin to having the power of the armed forces in the hands of someone hostile to the chief
executive. Two solutions have been suggested. One is the recruitment of more of the
groups who have often been the victims of police brutality, Blacks or gays for instance.
The other is the establishment of civilian review boards. Neither avenue is a panacea. See,
e.g., Lindsey Gruson, Syracuse Grapples with Debate Over Civilian Review of Police, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 3, 1992, at B 1 (information about the renewed popularity of the civilian review
board, an idea that has been in existence for more than a generation).
The sympathy for police and the affinity of the residents of Simi Valley was discussed
extensively after the verdict. The sympathy is rooted in the perception that the police have
a dangerous job, an idea that is communicated daily in one or more of the endless list of
police shows on prime-time television: Cops (Fox television broadcast), Law and Order
(NBC television broadcast), Commish (ABC television broadcast) and Secret Service (NBC
television broadcast). The list seems endless. I guess we could even count the seemingly
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But the police were not the victims in this case.
The approach to reasonableness used by the defense is one which
should only be used to understand the harm which is experienced by a
victim. It serves an important function in creating empathy, an under-
standing of the harm that is experienced by victims. The defense took a
test which was relevant to the harm experienced by Rodney King, and
turned it into something which could be used to exonerate the police
officers .44
Race should have been considered in this case. The jury should
have considered the fact that we live in a society in which racism is per-
vasive; where there are myths and stereotypes which perpetuate racism;
where symbols and symbolic action announce the superiority of one
group and the inferiority of another as a claim of power and a demand
for submission. The "control" theory that the defense offered and the
jury accepted is as much a legalization of racial hatred as the Jim Crow
laws of the prior generation. It commands black men to submit. 45 All
my son will have to do to avoid a beating like the one Rodney King
received is to remain prostrate at the feet of any white man with a badge
of authority who stuns him with an electric prod and then beats him with
innocuous shows, like Picket Fences (CBS television broadcast) which has police officers as
its main protagonists, although the show attempts to introduce issues of prejudice and
individual rights as something more than an inconvenience that prevents the police from
locking up heinous criminals.
44. There is a great deal of confusion about the need for empathy and understanding.
Most of it arises from the unwillingness to use terms like oppressor or oppressed. It makes
us seem too Marxist, too far to the left. The fact is that majority group members may be
victims of particular crimes, but they are not victims of systematic discrimination or dis-
advantagement. A police officer's job may be dangerous. A black, homosexual or wo-
man's life is dangerous, not because of what they have chosen to do for a living, but
because of who they are.
I have a very good, and extremely well intentioned friend, Louise Harmon, whose
confusion is illustrative of the problem. The other day she asked me whether I thought
she had been insensitive in a class when she described the market targeted by a developer
for Sun Valley, a retirement community. "What did you say?" I asked. She said she re-
marked on the ingenuity of those who brought "elderly, arthritic, sinus suffering, middle
class white people into the middle of the desert." I was confused. Was it the reference to
age that was insensitive, or the fact that she described the old people as arthritic and sinus
suffering that concerned her? No, she was concerned about the fact that she used the
term "white" to describe them. My immediate response was, "When has the term white
been used to someone's disadvantage?" She continued to explain what it was that both-
ered her about the class: Would minority students be upset because she left them out?
She didn't leave them out, I reminded her-the developer did; a point which she made
when she described the group to whom these homes were offered. The real question here
was whether she needed to tell these students that the exclusion of people of color was
wrong, something which might not occur to them on their own.
One of the best attempts I have seen to parse through the problem of providing a
remedy which explicitly recognizes the illegitimacy of a claim by those who are part of the
dominant culture can be found in Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering
the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (May 1989). See also Randall Kennedy, The Political
Correctness Scare, The Sixth Annual Brendan Brown Lecture, April 15, 1991, 37 Loy. L. REv. 231
(1991) (discussing the use of rhetoric by a conservative faculty member "inappropriately"
describing as rape, the public criticism he received for alleged racially insensitive com-
ments; see also the discussion of Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings and the use of
"lynching" symbols, infra note 57.
45. See supra note 25 for a discussion of the "control" theory.
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a club. Any resistance on his part will not be seen as heroic. The at-
tempt to stay on his feet while being beaten will not be perceived as an
example of his indomitable spirit. The reality we face, he and I, is one
where black men who resist are not heroes. They are something to be
feared.
46
I cried as I watched the violence erupt on the streets of Los Ange-
les. I cried as I watched and cringed as the foot of one young black man
hit the head of a man we now know by name, Reginald Denny, who was
lying prone on the street. The rioting was condemned. The violence
and the brutality, the property damage, the arson and random destruc-
tion, the anarchy and lawlessness appalled millions of Americans and
our President.
4 7
I cried because I recognized the rage of the rioters. 48 I have felt
that anger. I know how deep it runs, how hot it bums and I am afraid.
The last time I felt that anger, I was at home in the town where I grew
up; in the town where my father was born and raised; where my grand-
mother was born; and where my great grandfather settled after he es-
caped from slavery. I brought my son home to see the town where I was
born, to learn something about his family and his history.
One rainy day, I took my son and three young cousins, two boys and
a girl, to the new art museum. Our first stop was the museum shop. My
son, Chris, and my cousin, Marcus, were disappointed at the lack of se-
lection. The museum shop in Auburn, New York suffered in compari-
son to the shops in the Metropolitan Museum of Art which we had
visited just days earlier. As we turned to leave, Marcus was stopped by
the attendant who had been hovering in the background while we ex-
46. One of the police officers referred to the "hulk-like" strength of King and the fact
that after he had been forced to his knees, King rose to his full height of 6' 3"; even with
one arm behind him about to be cuffed, and a foot on his neck, the "expert" witness called
by the defense argued that there was subtle aggressive body language on King's part.
Riley, supra note 24, at 17. See also discussion of the impression that he had abnormal
strength, supra note 2.
47. "The wanton destruction of life and property is not a legitimate expression of
outrage with injustice. It is itself injustice. And no rationalization, no matter how heart-
felt, no matter how eloquent, can make it otherwise." President Bush 's Reaction to L.A. Riots,
CNN, Apr. 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Script file. Bruno Bettleheim dis-
cusses what it means to be civilized, an idea which he finds in the Oresteia by Aeschylus.
That part of what we call "civilized" behavior is our willingness to give up violence as a
means of enforcing a moral code. We accept as a replacement a process which involves
communal justice. What happens if the communal process fails, ifa part of the community
feels that it is excluded from the process? It may be that with a break-down in communal
justice, societies revert to the more basic methods of obtaining justice. Even if we cannot
prove such a grand theory, there is support for the idea that individuals who are deprived
of alternative means of achieving their aspirations will resort to violence. See BRUNO BET-
TELHEIM, SURVIVING AND OTHER ESSAYS 186, 193 (1980).
48. In the Milk documentary, there is a point where one man relates his experience
walking in the candlelight march that took place after Milk and Mayor Moscone were mur-
dered. The narrator describes a black man he saw standing at the curb, shaking his fist at
the marchers and asking the crowd, "Where is your anger?" The city saw that anger when
a jury rejected a murder verdict and convicted White of voluntary manslaughter. The
scenes of the riot in San Francisco, a city where gay men had been brutalized by the police,
showed violent confrontations between the police and the rioters, the destruction of prop-
erty and arson. See THE TIMES OF HARVEY MILK, supra note 24.
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amined postcards and trinkets. She accused him of stealing some small
toy. Marcus looked bewildered. She didn't ask for anything; she merely
accused him. He didn't know what to do.
Finally, I asked him to take his hands out of his pockets and show
her that he did not have anything in them. Meekly he emptied his pock-
ets. I am not sure that would have been enough if I hadn't looked
around and located the toy. It was in plain view although it might not
have been returned to the position it had occupied before we entered
the shop. I assured the attendant in the my most professional tone of
voice that if they wanted something, I would buy it for them. Of course,
that wasn't true. What parent would buy her child anything he wanted?
I just wanted to make it clear that they did not need to steal.
Kasha, the only girl among all those boys, followed me as I entered
the museum. We moved directly into the room where the work of
female artists was displayed. The boys went to the room with the sculp-
tures. Kasha and I had about five minutes peace before Chris was back
at my side. "Mom," he whispered, "that guard is following us every-
where we go." My first reaction was annoyance. I snapped at him, and
told him and the other boys to sit down on some chairs that were set up
before a television and VCR. It was irrelevant that the screen was blank.
They would only have to sit a moment or two while I read the display
that explained a Judy Chicago exhibit. I turned around to read and
before I finished a sentence, Chris was at my elbow. The attendant had
yelled at them for moving the chairs (which were on casters). I gave up
all hope of seeing the exhibit and told the children to go out to the car.
I complained to the museum director's assistant because the direc-
tor was not there. I was so angry; I had to work to keep my voice steady.
In a virtual whisper, I explained my anger and disappointment. My chil-
dren and I had been humiliated. We had been accused of theft and
treated like potential vandals. It was intolerable. It was racist. In the
background I saw another mother with two blond daughters in tow wan-
dering around the museum. No one was bothering her or her children.
The Assistant to the Director murmured a response. Her words were
meant to soothe me. She explained that the attendant who had been
hounding us was not concerned with race, she was concerned with age.
Teenagers had caused problems in the museum in the past. Of course, it
was all a misunderstanding. Apparently both the vigilant attendant and
the guard had not been sufficiently discriminating. They should be con-
cerned only when the teenagers are unaccompanied. She assured me
that she would talk to them both about their failure to distinguish be-
tween the two situations.
Her words did not soothe me; they made me angrier. Chris was
hovering in the background, watching how I handled this situation.
There were tears in my eyes-tears of anger and frustration. I was not
handling it well. As we left the museum, Chris muttered under his
breath, "I would like to punch that lady in the mouth." Even as I told
him no, that violence is not the right response, my whole being ached to
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do the same. I was no different than the gang members rioting in Los
Angeles. I wanted to cause that woman some pain. I wanted her to hurt
as much as I hurt, as much as those children hurt. I was in pain and it
was a pain that equaled or exceeded any physical pain I have ever exper-
ienced. I was angry at myself because I knew that my father would have
caused a scene. He would have yelled and screamed at the injustice of
the situation, and made so much noise that everyone in the museum
would have known what was happening. My problem is my commitment
to civility.
Most Americans were shocked by the brutal attack on innocent mo-
torists during the most recent riots in Los Angeles; attacks on individu-
als who blundered into the wrong intersection at the wrong time.
4 9
White Americans are always shocked at the idea of collective guilt. It is
an anathema to them.
50
49. The whites who were killed in Houston in 1917 were also people who blundered
into a black neighborhood, the Fourth Ward, as the soldiers marched down San Felipe
Street from Camp Logan. See Program from the Exhibit, The Houston Riots and Courts-
Martial of 1917, Carver Community Cultural Center, San Antonio, at 3 (on file with au-
thor). Although the soldiers marched with the intention of avenging the deaths of their
comrades caused by the Houston police, they also fired on a number of persons who inad-
vertently surprised them. Perhaps because they were soldiers and they did, in fact, engage
the enemy, the police and armed deputies, this is the one racial "riot" in U.S. history that
resulted in more Whites dead than Blacks. Id.
50. See generally Jude P. Dougherty, Collective Guilt, 35 AM.J.JuRIS. I (1990) (critique of
collective guilt and a discussion of the history of the idea of collective guilt). The criticism
is often leveled specifically at laws which are designed to remedy past discrimination. See,
e.g., Mike Barnicle,Justice Now Topsy-turvy, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 23, 1990, at 33 (scathing
indictment of the criminal justice system and lack of regard for issues of law and order
which the author attributes to the abandonment of the principle of individual responsibil-
ity for something called "collective guilt."); Charles Bremner, The Thought Police Closing Off
the American Mind, THE TIMES, Dec. 19, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Major News-
papers File (an indictment of the diversity movement and reference to George Will's the-
ory that the movement as a "function of the collective guilt generated in the 1960s and
from which Americans still suffer, despite a decade of Reagonism"); Reparations for African-
Americans, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1990, at B6 ("we had all better think carefully if we want to
abandon the principle of individual responsibility in favor of collective guilt"); Edwin
YoderJr., Reynolds Deserves to Be Heard, WASH. POST, May 17, 1983, at A19 ("The preferen-
tial theory of law carries the dubious corollary of hereditary or collective guilt.").
Justice Scalia takes the position that "ethnic whites" were not here during the period
of slavery. He uses this historical fact to support his conclusion that "ethnic whites" are
not responsible for the harm Blacks experienced as victims of slavery. Antonin Scalia,
Commentary: The Disease As Cure: In Order to Get Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account of
Race, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 151-52. He completely ignores the reality of assimilation;
the fact that all immigrants quickly learn the lessons of their new homeland. Racism is a
lesson learned along with the Pledge of Allegiance and the Bill of Rights. See Dwight
Green et al., Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance and the Myths of Colorless Individualism in Bostick v.
Florida, 67 TUL. L. REV. (forthcoming 1993).
When I was a teenager, I accompanied my half-sister when she went to look for apart-
ments. We visited one house where an elderly woman who, if I was any judge of accents,
had recently immigrated from Italy, showed us an apartment. She let us look, but she
quickly advised us that she could not rent the apartment to us. "I only rent to Americans"
she told us. I found it ironic that someone who had just arrived in this nation would
question my right to be called an American. I had been born in that town; so had my
father and my grandmother. This idea that somehow I was not a "real" American was
something that just wouldn't go away. It happened to me again when I was an exchange
student in Panama. I visited that country shortly after the riots in the Canal Zone in the
1960's. As we discussed who had a right to possess and control the Canal Zone, I sided
with the Panamanian family (I was not sympathetic to a Southern command that forced
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What is the idea of collective guilt if it is not a generalization? Here
we find one more example of the logic that is peculiar to prejudice.
Prejudice is supported by axioms; generalizations about the moral char-
acter and intellectual ability of groups of people who are different.
Americans have no problem with generalizations which sustain inequal-
ity, only with the generalizations which assign blame for it. White-
Americans do not want to believe that the result in the Rodney King
decision was the result of racism. 5 1 This is an example of the politics of
denial. Denial is essential to the perpetuation of the myth of innocence.
The politics of denial facilitate the use of terror and oppression by those
who are overtly racist, anti-Semitic, sexist or homophobic. 52 If you are
the victim of prejudice and racism, some claims of innocence are incred-
ible. I, for one, would not consider the police officers who watched the
beating of Rodney King innocent. In fact, I believe that those who deny
the reality of racism are as culpable as those who put it into practice.
The idea of collective guilt is not one which was invented by Blacks
to justify the riots in Houston in 1917, Watts in 1965 or Los Angeles in
1992. The idea is one which is recurrent in the history of Western Eu-
rope. Those who profess a high regard for the literary canon might con-
sider the lessons that can be learned there. In an effort to wean Chris
from his addiction to the literary genre commonly known as fantasy sci-
Panamanians to comply with the Jim Crow laws they carried with them to the Zone). The
other American who lived with the same family discredited my opinion by telling the fam-
ily members that I was not a "real American."
The Daughters of the American Revolution and the descendants of the Southern
planters are not the sole heirs of the legacy of slavery. We all share responsibility for the
problem of racism. Though it might have its roots in the past, it is nourished and sustained
in the present. Those who live with it, who fail to expose its ugliness and reveal the harm
it causes and who tolerate its continued existence, are all guilty. See, e.g., Charles
Krauthammer, Collective Guilt, Collective Responsibility, WASH. POST, May 3, 1985, at A5 (dis-
tinguishing the ideas of collective guilt and collective responsibility).
51. In Long Island, many Blacks blamed the verdict on racism, while whites blamed it
on poor prosecution. Bessent, supra note 2, at 51.
52. Bruno Bettelheim has explored the phenomenon of denial in connection with the
Holocaust and the behavior of both survivors of the camps and the German citizens who
claimed not to have known about the concentration camps.
Denial is the earliest, most primitive, most inappropriate and ineffective of all
psychological defenses used by man. When the event is potentially destructive, it
is the most pernicious psychological defense, because it does not permit taking
appropriate action which might safeguard against the real dangers. Denial there-
fore leaves the individual most vulnerable to the perils against which he has tried
to defend himself.
BETrELHEIM, supra note 47, at 84.
Racism is dangerous to our society, and the response of both Blacks and Whites is
often denial. Shelby Steele is a study in black denial. See generally STEELE, CONTENT OF OUR
CHARACTER, supra note 25. The vitality and the persistence of racism is becoming harder
and harder to deny. On my most recent visit to my home town, I learned that chapters of
white extremist organizations had chosen that town as the location for their headquarters.
Things had gotten so bad that a local newspaper editorial announced that they would no
longer print the messages of hate contained in letters to the editor written by the most
rabid member of one of these groups. See No Hatred Allowed, CITIZEN ADVERTISER, Oct. 11,
1992, at A4 ("We simply won't turn over our page to people who fail to express basic
respect."). Bruno Bettelheim's point warned us that it is when the message is the strong-
est, when the threat is the most obvious, when the danger is the greatest that we chose to
deny its very existence.
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ence fiction, I asked him to read A Tale of Two Cities.53 The second book
on my list was the Autobiography of Malcolm X.54 My choices might have
been fortuitous, or there might have been some unconscious recogni-
tion on my part of the extent to which these same stories were being
played out once again. As it turns out, the decision in the Rodney King
case and the reaction in South Central Los Angeles made their relevance
clear.
As Chris mentioned to me, the members of the street gangs in Los
Angeles might have been called "Jacques" during the French Revolu-
tion. What Dickens described, we have witnessed first hand. We have
seen the anger of people who have nothing to lose, people who have
been so degraded and so dehumanized that they no longer value human
life, their own or anyone else's. If Dickens were alive today, how would
he regard the riots in Los Angeles and the reaction to them? Perhaps he
would have recognized a similarity between the failure of the English to
acknowledge that the seeds of the revolution were sewn by the French
aristocracy and the assertion here that the abject poverty experienced in
the inner cities does not justify the riots. 5 5 This is not a matter ofjustifi-
cation. What is being offered is an explanation. It is a case of cause and
effect. Or, in the words of Malcolm X, it is a case of chickens coming
home to roost.
5 6
53. CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF Two CITEs (Bantam 1984) (1842). In his interpre-
tive afterword, Stephen Koch analyzes Dickens' attitude towards revolution and the "lucid
blindness that sees nothing but the oppression they need to sustain their rage-and their
new found omnipotence." Stephen Koch, Afterword to CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF Two
CITIES 359 (Bantam 1984) (1842). In his opinion, "The dominating political innovation of
our time has been Terror's fully organized expression of totalitarianism, whose primary
moral innovation has been to fully institutionalize Terror's rationale: collective guilt." Id.
at 360.
I find it difficult to accept his premise that the collective guilt argument which has
been applied to Germany since World War II and any version of "collective guilt" that
might have been used by the Nazis to justify the program of genocide as one in the same.
In my opinion that the idea of collective guilt is appropriate in the former case and not in
the latter. While collective guilt may provide a rationale for purges and putsches by "revo-
lutionary" regimes in Russia and China, including the "cultural" revolution in China. If
oppression sustains rage, then it seems clear to me that an end to oppression would mean
an end to the "dreams of vengeance" that sustain revolutionaries.
54. MALCOLM X, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X (Ballentine 1983) (1964) (with
the assistance of Alex Haley).
55. I have always liked Dickens, perhaps because he evidences class consciousness
that appeals to me as a daughter of the working class. Only recently I learned that he was
also a critic of slavery. Charles Dickens, AMERICAN NOTES (St. Martin's Press 1985)
(1842). My research assistant, Caroline Green, who must receive credit for finding this
book for me, was excited by the technique Dickens used to criticize the institution of slav-
ery. He printed advertisements that appeared in public papers offering rewards for news
of runaway slaves. Dickens used these ads to ridicule the institution of slavery and to
destroy the myths that supported it. Id. at 273. The ads described men, women and chil-
dren marked with iron collars, scars from lashings, marks from a hot iron on a face, a piece
cut out of an ear or a brand marking him or her as property. Id. at 274-76. It is interesting
to note that while we no longer suffer the mark of a brand that might be found on cattle
rather than humans, we might still be stunned by 50,000-volt stun guns. See Riley, supra
note 24, at 16.
56. Malcolm X later explained the statement which caused so much controversy: "I
said what I honestly felt-that it was, as I saw it, a case of 'the chickens coming home to
roost.' I said that the hate in white men had not stopped with the killing of defenseless
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I could not have done what the gang members in Los Angeles did. I
am a lawyer, and I respect the law. I have been taught to act with civility
and human decency. That is the way I try to live my life. That is what I
try to teach Chris. I have not acted on my anger because, unlike the
young people in Los Angeles, I have something to lose. Human life
means something to me because my life has meaning. The policies of
the Great Society provided me with a good place to live, at one point in
public housing, and a means of acquiring an education. I have a profes-
sion which I might not have but for the interest in diversity and the as-
signment of a positive value to race, in other words, affirmative action. I
am raising my son in a radically different environment. Affirmative ac-
tion is under attack, not by those truly committed to some concept of a
meritocracy but by those who employ a system of political patronage.
5 7
The political ideology of the right panders to racial fears. Much of the
progress I witnessed has been reversed during the Reagan/Bush years.
In my short lifetime, I have witnessed the best and the worst of the
human spirit respectively in the attempts to eliminate, and later to pre-
serve, social and economic inequality.
There is a chill in the air, and I pull my blanket of optimism closer
around me. I continue to believe that most human beings are decent
and kind and that they can change. I believe that most people are capa-
ble of generosity of spirit and a genuine concern for those who are less
fortunate, and that these are values which are part of the fabric of our
society. I know that there are people who are actively working to change
the world and eliminate unfairness, injustice and inequality. Yet it is
harder and harder to keep out the cold wind that has begun to blow, and
in moments of reverie, my mind turns to Madam Defarge. I have begun
to understand this most unsympathetic and unappealing character. I
understand the source of her bitterness and her anger. I almost begin to
understand her insatiable desire for revenge. 58 I wonder whether ulti-
mately the fear of young black men is misplaced. Perhaps the person to
black people, but that hate, allowed to spread unchecked, finally had struck down this
country's Chief of State." MALCOLM X, supra note 54, at 301.
57. Anyone who thought that this was a fight about meritocracy learned otherwise
when Clarence Thomas was nominated for the Supreme Court. President Bush described
Thomas as the best qualified candidate for the job. Most of us suspected that the qualifica-
tions to which he referred were something other than the credentials as a jurist or as a
scholar in the field of constitutional law. If for no other reason, the Senate should have
had some reservations about confirming a man who could not keep up with the develop-
ments in an area of law enforced by an agency which he headed. How knowledgeable
could he be if he delegated all responsibility for reading federal court decisions in the area
of civil rights, including a circuit court decision discussing sexual harassment, to a
subordinate? See Reuters, The Supreme Court: Excerpts From News Conference Announcing Court
Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1991, at A14.
58. Dickens' feminization of the guillotine reinforced his image of woman as a venge-
ful spirit and animates his creation, Madam DeFarge. Stephen Koch, supra note 53, at 360-
61. Lucie Manet is a stereotype of the Victorian concept of womanhood, all gentility and
perfect loyalty to father, husband and children. Madam DeFarge may be a stereotype as
well, but by the time Dickens finishes telling us about the atrocities which occurred at the
hands of the French aristocracy, of the horrible death of the members of Madam DeFarge's
family, her strength seems all the more admirable, and her desire for retribution is
understandable.
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fear is the mother of the young black man. 59
59. I would like to point out, for those who might not have thought about this possi-
bility, that some of the mothers of young black men are white women. My anger at the
treatment Marcus received at the museum gift shop was shared by my cousin through
marriage, M'Lynn Kenny, who is white.
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